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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A FAILING SCHOOL DISTRICT AND A FAILING STATUTE:
HOW BREITENFELD V. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF CLAYTON AND THE
UNACCREDITED DISTRICT TUITION STATUTE NEARLY
DESTROYED A STRUGGLING SCHOOL DISTRICT AND
DISRUPTED THE EDUCATION OF ITS STUDENTS

INTRODUCTION
On June 11, 2013, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued its opinion in
Breitenfeld v. School District of Clayton, which changed Normandy School
District’s immediate future and brought the issue of failing school districts
back into the public eye amidst a sea of controversy.1 After the Breitenfeld
decision, the Unaccredited District Tuition Statute (UDTS) required all
unaccredited school districts in Missouri to pay tuition and transportations
costs for students who wished to transfer to an accredited school district.2
Two paths were created for students in the unaccredited Normandy School
District at the beginning of the 2013–2014 academic year. Terry White, the
former star quarterback of the Normandy High School football team, along
with 474 other students who resided inside the Normandy School District’s
boundaries, boarded school buses as early as 6:00 AM to travel over twenty
miles to a new school in an accredited school district in St. Charles County.3
Those students were greeted warmly by students in the county who had an
open mind about welcoming these new students into their schools.4 Some of
these transfer students, such as those at Castilo Elementary School, were given
gift bags prepared by parents as welcoming gifts.5

1. Breitenfeld v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 399 S.W.3d 816 (Mo. 2013). This decision also
affected the unaccredited Riverview Gardens School District; however, this Note will focus on
Normandy School District. On December 10, 2013, the Missouri Supreme Court issued its ruling
in a very similar case involving the unaccredited Kansas City Public Schools and relied upon the
Breitenfeld rationale in reaching the same conclusions. Blue Springs R-VI Sch. Dist. v. Sch. Dist.
of Kansas City, 415 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2013).
2. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.131 (2000). All statutory references are to Missouri Revised
Statutes (2000), unless otherwise specified.
3. Nate Latsch, Normandy Transfer White Settles in at Francis Howell North, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 29, 2013, 2:50 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/sports/normandy-transferwhite-settles-in-at-francis-howell-north/article_675c79c5-7e56-53e1-84bd-7ea6dd6815b1.html.
4. Doug Moore, Francis Howell Opens Its Doors to Normandy Transfers, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Aug. 9, 2013, at A1.
5. Id.
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Other students, such as senior Makayla Smith, remained in the
unaccredited Normandy School District with a determined attitude. Makayla
said, “We want to make a fool out of what’s been said of our school.”6
Makayla, along with the other students who chose not to transfer, saw a large
crowd of parents and alumni cheering as they arrived for the first day of the
school year.7 The cheering was short-lived. In the following months, those
students who remained at Normandy were part of a school district that laid off
over 100 employees, closed an elementary school, and became financially
crippled by staggering tuition and transportation costs.8 Those crippling costs
resulted in the state taking control of the district’s finances and then eventually
dissolving Normandy School District.9
Part I of this Note will examine the court’s analysis and holding in
Breitenfeld as well as provide some background information on the Normandy
School District. Part II of this Note will discuss how the Breitenfeld holding
and the UDTS were implemented in relation to Normandy. This
implementation resulted in Normandy School District being pushed into
insolvency and created a very uncertain future for the school district, the
students, and the community. The financial issues created by the Breitenfeld
holding will be examined in Part III, and Part IV will discuss possible remedies
to these issues.
I. BREITENFELD V. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF CLAYTON
A.

Past Issues in Normandy School District and the Local Communities

In 2010, the provisionally accredited Normandy School District assumed
additional struggling school students when it agreed to accept students from
the neighboring Wellston School District.10 Wellston School District lost its
accreditation in 2003, and in 2005, the state stripped the elected local board of
its power.11 The state installed a three-person administrative board to oversee
the school district.12 Wellston bordered Normandy School District, and

6. Elisa Crouch, Community Rallies Around Normandy Schools, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Aug. 20, 2013, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Id.
8. Margaret Gillerman & Elisa Crouch, Normandy School Board Votes Against Paying Bill
for Transfers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 25, 2013, at A1.
9. MO. DEP’T ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., RESOLUTION OF THE STATE BOARD OF
EDUCATION (May 20, 2014), available at http://dese.mo.gov/sites/default/files/State%20Board%
20of%20Education%20-%20Normandy%20Governance.pdf.
10. David Hunn, School’s Over for Wellston District, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 18,
2009, at A1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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Normandy High School was actually inside Wellston’s boundaries.13
Eventually, the state disbanded Wellston School District and merged its
students with Normandy School District.14 When Normandy absorbed
Wellston’s 550 students, only 12% of Wellston’s students passed the state’s
communication arts tests, and barely 5% passed the state’s math tests.15
Normandy’s approximately 4500 students did a little better; 24% passed state
English tests and 15% passed the math test.16 The news media reported the
basics of the situation; however, there was no significant public outcry toward
disbanding Wellston and transferring its students to Normandy.17
Normandy continued to struggle amidst the increasingly tough standards of
state accreditation. On January 1, 2013, the Missouri Board of Education
reclassified Normandy School District as unaccredited, citing years of
underperformance.18 Normandy hired a new superintendent who was eager to
institute change.19 However, the Missouri Supreme Court case of Breitenfeld v.
School District of Clayton, along with its interpretation of the UDTS, would
significantly impact not only Normandy School District, but also every other
school district in the St. Louis area. The Breitenfeld decision and the
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education’s (DESE) subsequent
implementation of the Breitenfeld holding would bring intense public and
media attention to the issue of fixing unaccredited school districts.
B.

The Unaccredited District Tuition Statute: Making a Struggling District
Accountable to Do the Near Impossible

The UDTS provides that “a school district that loses accreditation with the
state board of education must pay tuition and transportation costs for any
resident pupil who attends an accredited school in another district in the same

13. David Hunn et al., State Schools Chief Moving to Dissolve Wellston District, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 8, 2009, at A1.
14. Hunn, supra note 10.
15. Hunn et al., supra note 13.
16. Id. For current data, see Missouri Comprehensive Data System, MO. DEP’T
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/quickfacts/SitePages/District
Info.aspx (search school district via “Missouri School District” pull-down menu; then select
desired option under Performance Data) (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
17. Hunn, supra note 10.
18. State Board Approves Emergency Action for Normandy School District, MO. DEP’T
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. (Feb. 18, 2014), http://dese.mo.gov/communications/newsreleases/state-board-approves-emergency-action-normandy-school-district.
19. District Names Dr. Ty McNichols Superintendent of Schools, NORMANDY MIDDLE SCH.,
http://normandy.mo.ncm.schoolinsites.com/?ac=1&PageName=LatestNews&Section=DistrictNe
ws&ItemID=49747&ISrc=District&Itype=News&IFrom=D&SID=395 (last visited Jan. 18,
2015). See also Valerie Schremp Hahn, Superintendent Makes Pitch to Parents for Normandy’s
Schools, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 18, 2013, at A4 (discussing Dr. McNichols’ efforts to
discuss with parents his planned changes and improvements to Normandy School District).
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or adjoining county.”20 Additionally, this section establishes the tuition rate
that the unaccredited school district must pay to the accredited school district
when a student elects to transfer under this statute.21 This tuition rate varies
depending on the amount the accredited school district pays to educate its
students.
Harold Caskey, a longtime Democratic state senator, wrote this piece of
legislation in 1993 with the intention that it would be a “stick” for school
districts on the verge of failure.22 In 1993, this “stick” was likely meant to
force the struggling St. Louis City Public Schools District to improve.23
Caskey stated the statute “forces the local districts to try to work their
problems out before the extreme measures set in.”24 Wayne Goode, another
senator at the time, said, “[The statute] was a wake-up call to clean up your
situation and get it fixed.”25 However, Caskey never envisioned that the statute
would be put to actual use.26
The UDTS was first put to actual use in 2003 when Wellston School
District lost its accreditation.27 About 100 students transferred to different
schools in St. Louis County, and Wellston paid more than $1 million in annual
tuition costs.28 The district had difficulty paying its tuition costs and faced
insolvency.29 Eventually, Wellston’s status temporarily changed to “interim”
accreditation to stop the transfers.30 In a newsletter, former Missouri Education
Commissioner Kent King wrote, “Another option would have been for us to
allow the Wellston School District to collapse and then assign its remnants to
surrounding districts . . . . That would have ended the need for state
intervention, but it would have only transferred Wellston’s problems to other
school districts.”31 However, that is exactly what eventually happened to

20. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.131 (2000).
21. Id.
22. Elisa Crouch, Confusion, Fear Grow Over Future of Transfers, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Aug. 4, 2013, at A1.
23. Id.
24. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Crouch, supra note 22; see also School District Will Lose Accreditation, Officials Say,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 17, 2003, at B2. See also Carolyn Bower, Wellston Schools
Should Lose Accreditation, Officials Report, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 8, 2003, at B2
(reporting on the reasons for the state education officials’ recommendation that the Board of
Education revoke Wellston’s accreditation).
28. Crouch, supra note 22; see also Carolyn Bower, Parents Inquire About Transfers for
Pupils, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 5, 2003, at B1 (discussing the option of transferring out
of Wellston School District due to the unaccredited classification of the district).
29. Crouch, supra note 22.
30. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Wellston; the state disbanded Wellston and assigned its students to the
neighboring Normandy School District.32
C. Procedural Posture and the Turner Decision
To understand the present situation, it is important to look back at how this
litigation evolved. Breitenfeld v. School District of Clayton originally started as
Turner v. School District of Clayton.33 In Turner, the plaintiffs were parents of
students who lived within the boundaries of the City of St. Louis Transitional
School District.34 Prior to the Transitional School District losing accreditation,
the parents entered into personal tuition agreements with Clayton School
District to have their children attend Clayton schools.35 Once the City of St.
Louis Transitional School District lost its accreditation, the parents requested
that Clayton charge the Transitional School District for their children’s tuition
pursuant to the UDTS.36 The School District of Clayton declined that request,
and the parents subsequently filed suit.37 On appeal, the court held that the
UDTS was applicable and required an accredited school district to accept a
student from an unaccredited school district as long as the accredited school
district was in the same or adjoining county.38
The Turner court followed the express language of the statute and did not
consider policy implications in its analysis.39 Specifically, the court noted that
“[t]he policy considerations and mandates regarding public schools and public
school funding are particularly well-suited for the state legislature and not the
courts.”40 Furthermore, the court noted that it would not “question the wisdom,
social desirability, or economic policy underlying a statute as these matters are
for the legislature’s determination.”41
The school districts unsuccessfully tried to argue that the UDTS was
preempted by provisions contained in Senate Bill 781 (SB 781), passed in
1998.42 The provisions of SB 781 included section 162.1060, which created the

32. Id.; Hunn, supra note 10.
33. Breitenfeld v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 399 S.W.3d 816, 819 (Mo. 2013); see also Turner v.
Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 670 (Mo. 2010).
34. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 663. The special administrative board of the transitional school
district governed the St. Louis Public School District once the public school district lost
accreditation in 2007. Id. at 662 n.2.
35. Id. at 663.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 669.
39. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 666.
40. Id. at 666 n.5.
41. Id. at 668 (quoting Winston v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 636 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Mo.
1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. at 665, 667.
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“urban voluntary school transfer program,”43 and section 162.1100, which
directs how the St. Louis Public School District is governed in the event it
loses its state accreditation.44 The court held that “[a]t most, SB 781 and §
167.131 are in tension with one another in that applying § 167.131 to the
transitional school district makes the implementation of SB 781 more difficult”
but that alone is “an insufficient basis for finding that the legislature intended
to impliedly repeal the application of § 167.131 to the City of St. Louis.”45
Clayton School District also unsuccessfully argued that the admission of
students pursuant to the UDTS is discretionary even though the statute contains
mandatory language.46 The court held that:
[The] plain and ordinary meaning of the language in § 167.131.2 that “each
pupil shall be free to attend the public school of his or her choice” gives a
student the choice to attend an accredited school, so along as that school is in
another district in the same or an adjoining county, and requires the chosen
47
school accept the pupil.

Thus, section 167.131.2 “does not give an accredited school chosen by a
student discretion to deny admission to that student.”48
D. From Turner to Breitenfeld
After the Turner court remanded the case for further proceedings, only one
plaintiff, Gina Breitenfeld, remained in the litigation, although the trial court
allowed taxpayers from Clayton and a taxpayer from St. Louis Public School
District to intervene to raise the argument that the UDTS violated the Hancock
Amendment.49 The Hancock Amendment is a “shield [to] protect taxpayers
from government’s ability to increase the tax burden above that borne by the
taxpayers on November 4, 1980” and is intended as a “tax and spending lid”
for state government.50 Article X, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution is
violated if both: (1) the State requires a new or increased activity or service of

43. Id. at 666 (internal quotation marks omitted). The “urban voluntary school transfer
program” was created to transfer students between the City of St. Louis and St. Louis County in
an effort to promote the desegregation of the city’s schools. Id. “Under the 1999 federal
desegregation order . . . eligible black students residing in the City of St. Louis are transferred to
participating school districts in the county, while certain white students residing in predominately
white school districts in the county are transferred to magnet schools in the city.” Id.
44. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 667.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 668.
47. Id. at 669.
48. Id.
49. Breitenfeld v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 399 S.W.3d 816, 821 (Mo. 2013).
50. Id. at 826 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that the two portions of the
Hancock Amendment that were relevant to the case were article X, sections 16 and 21 of the
Missouri Constitution. Id.
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political subdivisions, and (2) the political subdivision experiences increased
costs in performing that activity or service.51 The first prong of the “unfunded
mandate” test is established when the State requires local entities to initiate a
new activity or increase the level of an existing activity.52 However, it is not
satisfied when a statute imposes a requirement on governmental entities that
requires continuance of an existing activity.53 The second prong of the test is
satisfied when local entities experience increased costs in performing the new
mandated activity because the State failed to provide sufficient funding to
cover the costs of compliance.54
In evaluating the first prong, the Breitenfeld court determined that the
mandated education requirements of the UDTS were not new or increased.55 In
agreeing with the plaintiffs, the court noted that there is nothing new about
either school district providing a free public education, as the origins for free
public education are in Missouri’s government charter.56 Additionally, section
160.051.1 provided the statutory language to establish Missouri’s modern-day
public school system.57 Citing prior holdings, the court noted that it is a
fundamental right of children to attend the public school in their district.58 The
court also explained that deference is given to district boundaries to promote
fairness among the taxpayers.59 However, while noting that prior courts held
that liberal construction of education statutes are necessary to open, not close,
the doors of the schools against the children of the state, the court
distinguished the out-of-district situation by explaining that the education

51. Id.
52. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id.
54. Breitenfeld, 399 S.W.3d at 827.
55. Id. at 828.
56. Id. The court quoted the following from the Territorial Laws of Missouri, volume I,
chapter IV, section 14 (approved June 4, 1812): “[K]nowledge, being necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of public education shall be
encouraged and provided for.” Id. at 828 n.24.
57. Id. at 828.
58. Id. at 829 (citing State ex rel. Roberts v. Wilson, 297 S.W. 419, 420 (Mo. Ct. App.
1927); Lehew v. Brummell, 15 S.W. 765 (Mo. 1891)).
59. Breitenfeld, 399 S.W.3d at 829. The court quoted the following from State ex rel.
Halbert v. Clymer,
[W]hile [a public education] statute must be liberally construed . . . it would not be right
to permit children living in districts whose taxpayers have neglected or refused to
maintain schools to have the benefits free of charge, of schools in districts wherein the
taxpayers have burdened themselves to erect schoolhouses, employ competent teachers,
and maintain schools.
Id. (quoting State ex rel. Halbert v. Clymer, 147 S.W. 1119, 1120 (Mo. Ct. App. 1912).
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statutes were different in the past, and the court’s task in Breitenfeld was not to
determine the fairness of the UDTS as a matter of public policy.60
The long-standing mandate for school districts in Missouri is to provide a
free public education for all students who attend.61 Students attending an outof-district school district under statutory directives are included in this
mandate.62 The court concluded that nothing in the UDTS changed this
mandate as both St. Louis Public Schools (SLPS) and Clayton were providing
K–12 educational services to eligible students prior to the enactment of the
Hancock Amendment.63 Thus, the UDTS did not create a new mandate when it
was applied to allow SLPS resident students to attend accredited school
districts in adjoining counties as non-residents.64
Furthermore, the court held that there was no increased level of service
mandated by the UDTS for the purpose of applying the Hancock Amendment
test to accepting non-resident students.65 The court reasoned that an increase to
the student population of Clayton did not result in an increased level of
educational services provided.66 Specifically, the court held that the level of
services provided by Clayton is not changed even if the district provides the
services to more students under the statute.67 Clayton’s argument that it
provided additional services at a greater cost than SLPS failed because those
additional costs were not state-mandated; they were the choice of Clayton.68
The second prong of the Hancock test evaluates whether the burden is
shifted from the state to the local entity.69 The Breitenfeld court concluded that
the Hancock Amendment does not prevent local-to-local burden shifting of

60. Breitenfeld, 399 S.W.3d at 829 n.25. The court noted that sections 167.020 and 167.131
were examples of such statutes. Id. at 829–30.
61. Id. at 830.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 830.
65. Breitenfeld, 399 S.W.3d at 830.
66. Id. The court distinguished Rolla 31 Sch. Dist. v. State, 837 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1992), in
which a mandate for school districts to begin providing special education services to disabled
three- and four-year-olds was found to be an “unfunded mandate” and a violation of the Hancock
Amendment when it did not provide full funding. Id. The court reasoned that in Rolla 31 the
school would have been forced to provide public educational services to a new demographic who
were not already entitled to a free public education. Id. at 830–31.
67. Id. at 831.
68. Id. The Court noted that while these additional services were “beneficial and
commendable,” such discretionary spending was not subject to the Hancock test because it is not
mandated. Id. at 831 n.27.
69. Id. at 831.
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responsibilities.70 The total number of children eligible for education statewide
is not increased, and thus the state is simply shifting existing education
responsibilities between the sending and receiving districts.71 Simply, the
UDTS shifts an existing mandate from the unaccredited school district to the
accredited school district, and thus the purpose of the Hancock Amendment
was not violated.72
Conversely, the mandatory transport provisions of the UDTS constituted a
new mandate for SLPS.73 The court held that section 167.231 required districts
to provide transportation “[w]ithin all school districts except metropolitan
districts,” whereas the UDTS created a new mandate of providing
transportation to out-of-district schools.74 However, the court noted that to
prove a Hancock Amendment violation, there must be proof that the mandate
is also unfunded.75 This proof cannot be merely speculative and must be
“specific proof of new . . . duties and increased expenses, and these elements
cannot be established by mere common sense or speculation and conjecture.”76
Because SLPS did not have any designated accredited school districts to which
it would provide transportation, it was forced to speculate on the compliance
costs.77 Information presented at trial was too speculative because SLPS did
not have information available about the distance to the designated school and
how much it would cost.78 Consequently, the court held that transportation
provisions were not an unfunded mandate.79
Lastly, the school districts raised an impossibility defense that they could
not comply with the statute.80 Clayton School District claimed that it would be
impossible for the district to provide the necessary resources to educate the
potentially thousands of students that could choose to use the UDTS to transfer
into Clayton schools.81 Likewise, SLPS claimed it would be financially
impossible for the district to comply with the UDTS.82 SLPS argued that it
could not afford the tuition and transfer costs associated with implementing the
70. Breitenfeld, 399 S.W.3d at 831. The court reasoned that the overall purpose of the
Hancock Amendment was to “prevent the State from avoiding taxation and spending limitations
by shifting its responsibilities to local governments.” Id.
71. Id. at 831–32.
72. Id. at 832.
73. Id. at 833.
74. Id.
75. Breitenfeld, 399 S.W.3d at 833.
76. Id. at 834 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Kansas City v. Missouri, 317 S.W.3d 599, 611 (Mo.
2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Breitenfeld, 399 S.W.3d at 834.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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transfers of the potentially thousands of students out of SLPS and into
accredited school districts.83 The court held that “even assuming for purposes
of this argument that the defendant school districts are correct that this Court
should apply an affirmative ‘impossibility’ defense,” in these circumstances
the argument would not apply to the facts in this particular case.84 The court
reasoned that since SLPS regained provisional accreditation, there no longer
was the possibility of thousands of transfers under the UDTS, and that the case
was limited to Breitenfeld’s two children who were already attending Clayton
schools.85 Since the transfer opportunity of two students who already attend
Clayton schools would not result in the impossible compliance argued by the
school districts, an impossibility defense did not apply.86 However, the court
noted that it would not issue an advisory opinion on whether the trial court’s
determination that the impossibility defense might apply if thousands of
students did indeed transfer.87
The court’s ruling was narrow on the issue of the unfunded mandate
relating to transportation. Further, the court left the door open to an affirmative
defense of “impossibility” being successful given the right set of facts.88
II. IMPLEMENTING THE BREITENFELD HOLDING
A.

Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education Advisory
Publication

When the Missouri Supreme Court determined that the UDTS was
constitutional, it did not provide any guidance on how to implement this
statute. On June 19, 2013, the Missouri Department of Elementary and
Secondary Education (DESE) issued a document titled “Guidance for Student
Transfers from Unaccredited to Accredited School Districts” (Guidance for
Student Transfers).89 The guidance document stated that “[the unaccredited]
school district must provide transportation to at least one accredited/receiving
school district as established by its board of education.”90 Additionally, if the

83. Id.
84. Id. at 836.
85. Breitenfeld, 399 S.W.3d at 836.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. MO. DEP’T ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., GUIDANCE FOR STUDENT TRANSFERS
FROM UNACCREDITED DISTRICTS TO ACCREDITED DISTRICTS 1 (Dec. 22, 2014), available at
https://dese.mo.gov/sites/default/files/Transfer_Guidance.pdf. “[This document] is non-regulatory
guidance provided to offer districts assistance in implementing state law. The document will be
revised as the Department receives additional questions, when there is new statutory or judicial
direction, or as other information and circumstances require.” Id.
90. Id. at 2.
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designated receiving district was at capacity, the sending district should
designate an additional receiving district.91 However, the parent/guardian shall
be responsible for transportation if the parent/guardian chooses to enroll the
student in a different school district.92
Guidance for Student Transfers also provided guidance for accredited
school districts that may receive students from unaccredited school districts.
According to the document, accredited school districts “should adopt and
publish a policy for class size and student-teacher ratios between the desirable
and minimum MSIP5 Resource Standards for all grade levels.”93 Also,
accredited school districts should publicly post on their websites the student
transfer application as well as the admission process and the current available
enrollment slots by grade level.94
Additionally, Guidance for Student Transfers provided recommendations
for other possible scenarios. For example, students should be permitted to
complete the school year at the accredited school district if the unaccredited
school district regains accreditation.95 If a tuition disagreement or a payment
failure occurs, DESE recommended that students should be permitted to finish
the school year.96 The document instructed unaccredited school districts to pay
the receiving school districts within ten days of receiving their monthly state
aid distribution.97 If the unaccredited school district fails to send tuition
payments for two successive months, the Department will withhold the amount
of the tuition for each transferring student and will distribute those funds to the
receiving district or districts.98 Lastly, Guidance for Student Transfers also
included guidance for missed enrollment deadlines, requests for assignment to
a specific building, interscholastic Missouri State High School Activities
Association activities, early childhood education, vocational school admission,
and students with Individual Education Plans.99
B.

Implementation Related to Normandy School District: The Path to
Financial Ruin

Almost immediately after the Missouri Supreme Court published its ruling
in Breitenfeld, concerns about implementing the holding centered on class

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1.
MO. DEP’T ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 89.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
See MO. DEP’T ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 89, at 1–3.
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sizes and staffing shortages in accredited school districts.100 The director of the
Cooperating School Districts of Greater St. Louis was quoted in the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch as saying: “What we’ve been asking for is reasonable
parameters. Class sizes. When can we say we’re full? School boards need to
have some local control or the quality of the district would decline and no one
would want to transfer.”101 Another person offered this prediction:
“Competition is good for schools. . . . When students start leaving, they need to
and will start to respond.”102 That prediction turned out to be correct; however,
another parent’s prediction that students would not transfer in “droves” would
turn out to be incorrect.103
The directive from DESE required that Normandy School District
designate a school district to which it will provide transportation for students
wishing to transfer.104 On July 2, 2013, Normandy announced its decision to
provide transportation to Francis Howell School District in neighboring St.
Charles County, which is over twenty miles away.105 The Normandy
superintendent stated that the district looked at academic performance, class
sizes, and available space when choosing Francis Howell.106 Almost
immediately, parents of Francis Howell students began objecting to the transfer
students from Normandy.107 Some were worried about violence; others were
worried about academic performance.108
Francis Howell eventually hosted a crowded town-hall meeting attended
by 2500 people on the issue of being forced to accept Normandy students.109
One parent spoke of being worried about the “violent behavior” that the
transfer students would bring.110 Other parents were angry about the possibility
of lower test scores and demanded that the board lower class sizes to prevent
transfer student enrollment.111 Another speaker insisted it was not a race issue,

100. Elisa Crouch, School Transfer Ruling Issue Is [a] Puzzle, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
June 13, 2013, at A1.
101. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id.
104. See MO. DEP’T ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 89, at 2.
105. Jessica Bock & Elisa Crouch, Transfers Face a Long Road, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
July 2, 2013, at A1.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. At least at the high school level, concerns about violence may have been a reasonable
reaction based upon violence data from Normandy High School in the recent past. See Elisa
Crouch, Normandy: Most Dangerous School in the Area, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 5,
2013, at A1 (listing multiple violent incidents at Normandy High School).
109. Jessica Bock, Parents Vent Anger and Concerns About Safety, Test Scores in Wake of
Transfers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 12, 2013, at A1.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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but rather “Normandy is not performing in their own district, so they are going
to come to Francis Howell and bring [Francis Howell] down.”112
Normandy transfer students began attending Francis Howell on August 8,
2013.113 The transfer students had to board their school buses earlier than
usual, but aside from a few minor logistical issues, no negative events were
reported.114 The transfer students were also able to join athletic teams at their
new schools.115
The first significant negative issue drawing media attention occurred at the
Normandy School Board meeting on October 24, 2013 when the board voted
3–2 against paying the tuition bill due to the receiving school districts.116 The
board also decided to close an elementary school and lay off over 100
employees.117 One board member said his decision was based upon the fact
that the students remaining in Normandy would not have the same access to
educational resources as those in other districts.118 At its meeting on November
13, 2013, the board reversed its decision and voted to pay the outstanding
bills.119 Unfortunately, the district did not have much choice as the state said it
would simply redirect Normandy’s funding to districts that were due tuition
payments.120
The situation became more perilous in early 2014 when Normandy
announced that it might not have enough money to meet its payroll through the
rest of the year.121 When Normandy’s superintendent asked what would
happen to Normandy’s students if the district failed to meet payroll, the state
education commissioner responded by saying that the district would become
lapsed, and the State Board of Education, pursuant to state law, would decide

112. Id. For a discussion of the racial implications of the transfer, see infra text accompanying
notes 171–72.
113. See Moore, supra note 4.
114. Id.
115. Jim Faasen, High School Transfers Are in a Familiar Spot, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
(Aug. 13, 2013, 12:15 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/sports/high-school-transfers-are-in-afamiliar-spot/article_ac00c4d0-9458-56ad-a449-f18e503e32e5.html. See also MO. DEP’T
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 89, at 2 (granting eligibility for students who
transfer pursuant to the UDTS to participate in interscholastic Missouri State High School
Activities Association activities sponsored by the receiving school district).
116. Gillerman & Crouch, supra note 8.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Margaret Gillerman, Normandy School Officials Vote to Pay Tuition for Transfers, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 14, 2013, at A2.
120. See discussion supra Part II.A.
121. Elisa Crouch, Normandy at Crossroads, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 2014, at
A1.
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where to send the students.122 The governor made a request to the state
legislature for $5 million to get Normandy School District through the rest of
the academic year; however, the legislature did not act on the request.123 One
senator predicted that the request would be an “uphill battle” because the
legislature would be wary of setting a precedent.124
Due to Normandy’s financial struggles and impending insolvency, the
State Board of Education took immediate action on February 18, 2014.125 The
Board imposed financial oversight of Normandy School District which
required that “[a]ll expenditures, contracts, financial obligations and any other
action with fiscal implications must be approved by the Department [of
Elementary and Secondary Education] beginning immediately and through the
remainder of the year.”126 By assuming financial oversight of Normandy, the
department ensured that Normandy students would finish the school year in
their own districts and that the seniors would graduate as scheduled.
After years of struggling, Normandy School District finally met the same
fate as the former Wellston School District. On May 20, 2014, the Board of
Education voted to remove Normandy’s accreditation effective June 30, 2014
and to void all contracts with the school district.127 The Board created the
Normandy Schools Collaborative, with a Joint Governing Board appointed by
the Board of Education, to administer the school system in Normandy and
report directly to the state.128 The new school district will not have an

122. Id. According to the newspaper account of the meeting, Commissioner Nicastro said this
would happen pursuant to state law but did not list what statute she was referring to. Meeting
minutes were not yet publically available as of the time of this publication. Commissioner
Nicastro was likely referring to section 162.081 which states:
1. Whenever any school district in this state fails or refuses in any school year to provide
for the minimum school term required by section 163.021 or is classified unaccredited,
the state board of education shall, upon a district’s initial classification or
reclassification as unaccredited . . .
(2) Determine the date the district shall lapse and determine an alternative governing
structure for the district. . . .
3. Upon classification of a district as unaccredited, the state board of education may:
(2) Lapse the corporate organization of the unaccredited district and:
(c) Attach the territory of the lapsed district to another district or districts for
school purposes[.]
MO. REV. STAT. § 162.081 (2000) (emphasis added).
123. Crouch, supra note 121.
124. Id.
125. State Board Approves Emergency Action for Normandy School District, MO. DEP’T
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. (Feb. 18, 2014), http://dese.mo.gov/communications/newsreleases/state-board-approves-emergency-action-normandy-school-district.
126. Id.
127. MO. DEP’T ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 9, at 1.
128. Id.
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accreditation classification for its first three years of operation.129 Because the
new district is not “unaccredited,” no students will be permitted to transfer
under the UDTS.130
III. ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL IMPACT ON NORMANDY OF THE POSTBREITENFELD UDTS IMPLEMENTATION
The financial implications of implementing the UDTS are staggering. The
total projected cost to Normandy will be between $13 and $15 million per
year.131 This amounts to an approximately 30% reduction in funding while
decreasing the number of students by only 20%.132 Dr. Ty McNichols,
superintendent of Normandy School District, explained that the district’s
financial difficulties were not a result of mismanaged money, but rather the
result of $1.3 million worth of tuition payments each month for which the
District was not able to plan.133
Cutting costs will not salvage Normandy’s financial situation because the
fixed overhead costs cannot be reduced when the number of students
decreases. The deputy commissioner of education explained this situation as
follows:
The electricity cost is the same, your fixed cost of operation is the same and
your debt service and facilities costs don’t go down any . . . [a]nd you don’t
want to take three classes that were 22 students apiece and make two that are
134
35. You can’t do proportional cuts based on a decrease in revenue.

129. Normandy Schools Collaborative to Operate with New Leadership, MO. DEP’T
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. (June 16, 2014), http://dese.mo.gov/communications/newsreleases/normandy-schools-collaborative-operate-new-leadership.
130. Id.
131. Normandy Schools: District Plans to Stay Open, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 16,
2014, at A2.
132. Elisa Crouch & Jessica Bock, Troubled Districts Hemorrhage Funds, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Feb. 10, 2014, at A1. UDTS specifies how receiving school districts should calculate
their tuition costs to bill to the unaccredited school district. Id. In some cases, the amount of
tuition bill exceeds the normal per-student funding for the unaccredited school district. Id. For
example, Clayton School District charges $20,768 tuition to Normandy for each high school
student. Id. Yet Normandy only receives approximately $12,000 in total funding for each high
school student, thereby creating a net loss for the already struggling school district. See Dale
Singer, Districts Will Get Paid for Transfer Students, Nicastro Says, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Oct. 25,
2013, 6:15 PM), https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/33408/normandy_payments_102513
(quoting a statement from the Normandy School District that it is losing 30% of its funds while
having 88% of its students remain in the district).
133. Normandy Schools: District Plans to Stay Open, supra note 131.
134. Jason Hancock, Missouri Lawmakers Ponder Budget Impact of Transfers on KC
Schools, KANSAS CITY STAR (Jan. 15, 2014, 1:36 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/2014/01/15/
4753551/missouri-lawmakers-ponder-budget.html#storylink=cpy.
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Furthermore, he added that this fact is especially true in a district trying to
improve its student achievement.135 A statement from Normandy School
District described the situation in a very grim manner: “This unprecedented
expenditure renders it virtually impossible for us to educate the 88[%] of
students remaining in Normandy schools and simultaneously regain
accreditation.”136
Despite threats of non-payment, Normandy had almost no choice but to
pay the tuition bills and deal with the consequences.137 These consequences
included closing an elementary school and laying off 103 employees, most of
whom were teachers.138 When it came time to vote to pay the tuition bill,
school board member Terry Artis, who cast the lone dissenting vote, said that
“voting to pay the money to other districts when Normandy needed it to
educate its remaining students was ‘like someone handing you a pistol’ to
commit suicide.”139 Education Commissioner Nicastro described the situation
bluntly by saying, “If left unchanged, the current system is financially
unsustainable.”140
While Normandy faced impending bankruptcy caused by these
questionable tuition payments, the money that it was paying for tuition was not
being used effectively. The UDTS is silent on the issue of how the receiving
school districts should use the tuition payments. Multiple school districts chose
to not spend most or all of the funds.141 These districts cited concerns that they
did not want to depend on this money to fund teachers and other long-term
costs for fear that Normandy might stop paying tuition.142 In researching the
expenditures of school districts receiving these tuition payments, the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch found that less than half of the eleven districts that received
90% of the transfer funds have added teachers or staff as a result of new
transfer students from the unaccredited school districts.143
Without state intervention to manage Normandy’s finances, April 1, 2014
appeared to be the day that Normandy School District could go insolvent.144
135. Id.
136. Singer, supra note 132.
137. Bram Sable-Smith, Reversing Course, Normandy Board Votes to Pay Tuition Bills, ST.
LOUIS BEACON (Nov. 13, 2013, 9:27 PM), https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/33674/nor
mandy_board_meeting_111313. DESE stated that the state would withhold funding to the
unaccredited school district and divert those funds to the districts due the tuition payments if the
unaccredited school district was unable or unwilling to pay the tuition bill. MO. DEP’T
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 89, at 2.
138. Gillerman, supra note 119.
139. Id.
140. Hancock, supra note 134.
141. Crouch & Bock, supra note 132.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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This would have immediately displaced the remaining Normandy students into
various other school districts. Multiple nearby school districts were already
struggling.145 The quality of education did not significantly improve when
Wellston School District dissolved and the students were absorbed by
Normandy.146 Just a few years later, these students are again in the same
situation with the dissolution of Normandy School District. The financial
collapse of Normandy is even more disappointing and fundamentally unfair,
considering that most of the tuition dollars were not spent by the receiving
school districts.
The UDTS opens the door to different educational opportunities for some
students of unaccredited school districts. Unfortunately, the devastating
financial effects of implementing this law throw the education experience of
the remaining students into constant turmoil. The benefit to the 20% of
students who transfer does not outweigh the harm caused to the 80% of
students who remain in an unaccredited school district with almost no hope of
improvement. For the UDTS to truly benefit unaccredited school districts, the
Missouri legislature must find an alternate funding mechanism that does not
destroy the unaccredited school district at the expense of paying school
districts that do not even need all of those funds to educate the transfer
students.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
A challenged school is the product of a challenged society.147 In his paper,
Carl Parsons details the experience of a secondary school in an impoverished
area of England.148 He argues that “vocal political commitment and extensive
academic comment” have resulted in little changes in the outcomes and
prospects for the children in that impoverished area.149 “Where the educability
of children has been impaired since infancy and the roots of disaffection and

145. In fact, under the new evaluation plan in effect as of the 2012 and 2013 school year,
referred to as the “Missouri School Improvement Plan” or “MSIP5,” several of the surrounding
districts would be categorized as being only provisionally accredited. Dave Singer, St. Louis
Schools Fare Poorly in First Version of New Education Standards, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Aug. 23,
2013, 12:13 AM), https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/32423/school_accreditation_2013_
082113. These include the Jennings, Ferguson-Florissant R-II, and University City School
Districts. Id. However, it is important to note that “state education officials have said they want at
least three years of MSIP5 data before they decide on a district’s accreditation.” Id.
146. See Crouch & Bock, supra note 132.
147. Carl Parsons, Challenged School—Challenged Society: Stacking the Odds Against the
Poor, 65 EDUC. REV. 267, 267–68 (2013).
148. Id. at 267.
149. Id. at 268.
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low aspiration lay outside the school, brilliant leadership and a core of
inspirational, well-organized teachers are not enough.”150
Here, the root of Normandy School District’s problems goes back to many
years of high poverty and low performance. Simply transferring a portion of
the students to other schools does not fix the problem and actually makes the
school situation even worse for those students who are left behind. It is not
possible to address the entire failing school situation by moving students away
and ignoring the poverty and socioeconomic issues at the root of a school
district’s problems.151
The Missouri Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion in Breitenfeld clearly
interpreted the UDTS as constitutional but did leave open the door for an
impossibility defense with the correct set of facts.152 However, once the
impossibility situation has been reached, the school district almost certainly
will not have the financial resources to mount an expensive and time
consuming challenge to the UDTS before falling into bankruptcy or dissolving.
This appears especially clear with the Normandy situation, as Normandy will
almost certainly become insolvent long before its lawsuit makes its way
through the court system.153 As discussed above, the law in its current form is
not an effective solution to the problem of failing school districts. The
following sections analyze some proposed solutions and other considerations.
A.

Charter Schools Are Not the Answer; School Transfer Is Not the Answer
Either

One plan that was proposed to address the unaccredited school district
situation involves placing unaccredited districts under the control of the state
and giving control of local schools to nonprofit operators in an arrangement
similar to charter schools.154 Another unofficial proposal included expanding
UDTS to allow transfer to more charter schools.

150. Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
151. Education Commissioner Chris Nicastro recently stated: “Moving the children is not an
answer. What we have to do is figure out how to improve the schools where they live. Children
have a right and a need to have quality schools in their neighborhood, and that’s what we’re
intending to create.” Dale Singer, Missouri Board Limits Normandy Transfers, Appoints Some
Member to New Governing Panel, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (June 16, 2014, 8:11 PM), http://news.
stlpublicradio.org/post/missouri-school-board-limits-normandy-transfers-appoints-some-mem
bers-new-governing-panel.
152. Breitenfeld v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 399 S.W.3d 816, 836 (Mo. 2013).
153. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
154. See ETHAN L. GRAY ET AL., THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS: ENSURING GREAT PUBLIC
SCHOOLS IN EVERY NEIGHBORHOOD 32–33 (2014). Even before its official release, the authors
released the draft version of the plan due to the “substantial interest in this project” and the
“complexity of the ideas.” ETHAN L. GRAY ET AL., THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY: ENSURING GREAT PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN EVERY NEIGHBORHOOD 4 (Jan. 2014),
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Charter schools are analogous to the school transfer issue under the UDTS
in that both charter schools and transfers pursuant to the UDTS allow students
(and their tuition dollars) to transfer out of the traditional public school system
and into different schools.155 A spokesperson for Clayton School District, one
of the districts with the highest per-student tuition costs being billed to the
unaccredited districts, described the UDTS as forcing Normandy to
“hemorrhage money.”156 Charter schools would also siphon money from the
unaccredited school districts causing the same “money hemorrhaging” effect as
the existing UDTS statute. Looking at strictly the financial implications,
neither charter schools nor UDTS transfers are a long-term answer to
improving struggling school districts.157
Charter schools and school transfer options likely will not fix the quality of
education for the poorest children in unaccredited school districts. Research
has shown that poor children are more concentrated in traditional public
schools in districts where private, charter, and magnet schools were present.158
Parents who are more engaged and have more resources tend to more often
self-select and enroll their children into charter schools, which further
contributes to a separation and isolation of poor students in traditional public
schools.159 As a result, charter schools “attract a more homogenous and less
impoverished student population than traditional public schools.”160
Furthermore, poor and minority students face barriers to charter school
enrollment.161
Research from urban school districts in New York state shows that other
factors have a much greater effect on student performance than the choice of

available at http://mediad.publicbroadcasting.net/p/kwmu/files/201401/Conditions_for_Success_
-_Executive_Summary_and_Full_Report.pdf.
155. See MO. REV. STAT. § 160.415 (2000).
156. Crouch & Bock, supra note 132.
157. Michael Jones, vice president of the State Board of Education, stated, “A 300-student
school does not solve the systemic problems in Normandy.” Elisa Crouch, In Normandy, Charter
Schools Struggle to Take Root, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 9, 2014, at A1.
158. Salvatore Saporito & Deenesh Sohoni, Mapping Educational Inequality: Concentrations
of Poverty Among Poor and Minority Students in Public Schools, 85 SOC. FORCES 1227, 1227
(2007).
159. Robert Bifulco & Helen F. Ladd, Institutional Change and Coproduction of Public
Services: The Effect of Charter Schools on Parental Involvement, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 553, 557–58 (2006).
160. Robert M. Silverman, Making Waves or Treading Water: Analysis of NY Charter
Schools, 48 URBAN EDUC. 257, 263 (2013) (citing multiple studies); see, e.g., Bifulco & Ladd,
supra note 159.
161. Silverman, supra note 160, at 272. The author explains that there were “noticeably fewer
students in charter schools who were eligible for free lunch programs” while students eligible for
reduced-price lunch (indicating less poverty) were more likely to enroll in charter schools. Id.
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school (charter or traditional public school).162 The percentage of students
eligible for free lunch and the percentage of students suspended tended to have
the most effect, which suggests that broader systemic factors are influencing
student performance in urban school districts.163 This has overarching effects
regardless of the structure of school.164 The author noted that high levels of
poverty “can be an overwhelming challenge for students attempting to access
all of the opportunities available in public schools.”165 Furthermore, increased
levels of suspension, absenteeism, and other disruptions in attendance have
detrimental effects on students’ learning.166 Also, the percentage of African
American students and the turnover rate of teachers were correlated with
student outcomes.167 The authors stated “[t]he percentage of [African
American] students is a proxy for the level of segregation in the school
districts.”168
This research can be applied to the situation in Normandy School District
as Normandy has a high level of poverty.169 Additionally, students must wake
up at extremely early hours to catch school buses for the twenty-mile trip to a
far-away school district. This burden does not make attendance easier for the
children who are attempting to better their education but are forced to endure
long bus rides to places far beyond their communities. Furthermore, Normandy
also has a high rate of disruptions in attendance due to suspensions as
Normandy High School has the second highest rate of disciplinary incidents in
Missouri.170
While students who transfer from Normandy171 (a predominantly minority
school district) to Francis Howell172 (a predominantly non-minority school

162. Id. at 282.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Silverman, supra note 160, at 282.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Missouri Comprehensive Data System, MO. DEP’T ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC.,
http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/guidedinquiry/Pages/District-and-School-Information.aspx
(follow
“District Demographic Data” hyperlink; select “Normandy Schools Collaborative” from
“District” pull-down menu; select all school years under “School Year” pull-down menu; follow
“View Report” button; scroll to page 2) (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
170. Crouch, supra note 108 (citing data that Normandy High School had 27.8 reported
incidents per 100 students, with reported incidents defined as an incident which resulted in a
suspension of ten or more days).
171. Id.
172. Missouri Comprehensive Data System, MO. DEP’T ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC.,
http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/guidedinquiry/Pages/District-and-School-Information.aspx (follow
“District Demographic Data” hyperlink; select “Francis Howell R-III” from “District” pull-down
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district) will experience less segregation, those students left behind in
Normandy are still segregated. The authors state that “[s]eparate and unequal is
prima facie across New York’s urban school districts”;173 the same appears to
be true with Normandy School District which is comprised of 98.6% minority
students.174 The UDTS has the potential to benefit the 20% of Normandy
students who transfer, but does not improve the education for the 80% of the
students who remain in the failing Normandy School District.
Perception plays a role in the failing public schools.175 The public school
system becomes more segregated along socioeconomic lines when the lowermiddle class and working poor parents choose to move their children out of the
traditional public schools.176 This helps validate perceptions that public schools
are continually failing, since the removal of students who are relatively better
prepared for school may contribute to driving down average scores on
statewide tests of students in traditional public schools.177 This situation was
even more pronounced in Normandy due to that district adding all the students
from the even lower performing Wellston School District just a few years
prior.178 Now that all students have the option of transferring schools and 20%
of the student body is gone (presumably with the most involved parents who
made the choice to send their child to an accredited school district), 30% of
Normandy’s budget is also gone.179 This likely leaves behind the most
academically troubled students with an even smaller budget to attempt to turn
around this failing school district.180
Barriers to obtaining educational benefits exist when relocating poor
children to non-poor neighborhoods with higher achieving schools. Social

menu; select all school years under “School Year” pull-down menu; follow “View Report”
button; scroll to page 2) (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
173. Silverman, supra note 160, at 282.
174. Missouri Comprehensive Data System, supra note 169.
175. Silverman, supra note 160, at 283.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See discussion supra Part I.A.
179. See supra text accompanying note 132. William Tate, chair of the department of
education at Washington University in St. Louis, explained this factor in the following way: “Add
in the fact that if you decide to transfer, and your parents or guardians are engaged enough in the
system to get you out of your old school, you have a robust family structure. So the people who
transfer are different from those who stay.” Dale Singer, Place Matters: Changing Schools Can
Change Student Test Scores, Research Shows, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Aug. 22, 2013, 6:35 AM),
https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/32416/transfer_student_achievement_082113.
180. A board member from an accredited school district explained this situation as follows:
“[W]orse yet, the very kids who decide to leave are most likely the best students who are the
brightest hope for improving the educational culture of the district, and for raising the very same
test scores that got the district in trouble in the first place.” Scott Anderson, Op-Ed., Transfer
Solution Is a Prescription for Failure, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 24, 2013, at A17.
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scientists conducted an experiment in which impoverished families were
relocated from low-income neighborhoods to high-income areas and higher
performing schools.181 Most students were unable to improve their classroom
grades and also had the most adjustment difficulties.182 Even if improvements
were noted, they were short-lived.183 Furthermore, while the students became
residents of middle-income neighborhoods, they were not members of middleincome communities, as the word community implies a “group of
geographically bounded people who share a common identity, institutions,
social interactions, and daily experiences.”184 Without supportive services,
relocation or transfer programs alone may not result in increased student
achievement.185
Applying these results to Normandy School District suggests that
improvements may be limited for the students who choose to transfer. Even if
improvements are noted, they will likely be short-lived. The transfer statute
also creates the possibility of a school oscillating between accredited and
unaccredited in which some years students will transfer and other years they
will not. This may create a situation where families (and individual students)
switch back and forth between different school environments, which further
challenges the ability of students to increase academic achievement.
Furthermore, even if the students stay in the accredited school district, they
will likely not be assimilated as members of those communities outside the
school walls. Instead they will still be in a separate and socioeconomically
segregated community twenty miles away from their classmates.
More importantly, transferring students to charter schools or other public
school districts does not address the problem of educating the children left
behind in the struggling public school district. The UDTS is expensive to
implement, and the costs get passed on to those students who remain in the
unaccredited school district. For any solution involving charter schools or
public school transfer, there must be an alternative funding source that does not
cripple the unaccredited public school district. Furthermore, charter schools
and school transfers do not address the racial or socioeconomic segregation
that has been prevalent in the Normandy community for many years.

181. Micere Keels, The Importance of Scaffolding the Transition: Unpacking the Null Effects
of Relocating Poor Children into Nonpoor Neighborhoods, 50 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 991, 991
(2013).
182. Id. at 1012.
183. Odis Johnson, Jr., Relocation Programs, Opportunities to Learn, and the Complications
of Conversion, 82 REV. EDUC. RES. 131, 163 (2012).
184. Keels, supra note 181, at 1012.
185. Id. at 992.
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Community Involvement and Resource Integration Are Both Needed to
Overcome the Effects of Poverty on School Performance

In addition to the implementation of the UDTS being financially
unsustainable, transferring students to far away districts does not address the
community issues that greatly contribute to a failing school district. Learning is
not limited to just the classroom, and the issue of failing school districts will
not be solved without significant family and community involvement in each
student’s education. Parents who do not give in to learned helplessness and
other problems related to raising students in poverty will help to limit the
effects of socioeconomic status on student performance.186
Poverty and economic deprivation have an “overwhelming impact” on
student outcomes.187 The failure of so many reform efforts has lead some
scholars to conclude that there is “little hope for substantive reform without
more robust community participation as a key component.”188 A more
comprehensive approach is needed to meet the social and educational needs of
students in struggling districts.189 Issues such as absenteeism and suspensions,
which are highly influential on student performance, cannot be cured with
student transfers to other school districts, as the underlying problems still
remain.190 Educational policymakers need to work with other agencies and
community groups to develop strategies that are designed to reduce the adverse
impact of poverty on educational outcomes.191
Until the community issue of poverty is addressed, reforms inside the
school likely will not yield the type of results that our society desires.
According to recent research, schools in the United States with fewer than 25%
of their students living in poverty rank among the world’s highest scorers.192
However, when scores of students from schools with high poverty rates are
186. See Robert H. Bradley & Robert F. Corwyn, Socioeconomic Status and Child
Development, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 371, 384 (2002); Sarah Ransdell, There’s Still No Free
Lunch: Poverty as a Composite of SES Predicts School-Level Reading Comprehension, 56 AM.
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 908, 909 (2012) (citing various studies).
187. Silverman, supra note 160, at 285.
188. Aaron Schutz, Home Is a Prison in the Global City: The Tragic Failure of School-Based
Community Engagement Strategies, 76 REV. EDUC. RES. 691, 702 (2006).
189. Silverman, supra note 160, at 285. Furthermore, Ransdell made the following blunt
statement: “If a school district . . . chooses to improve reading comprehension scores by
improving teaching and instruction alone, it will fail.” Ransdell, supra note 186, at 922. Ransdell
argued that school districts should provide social workers who attend to the need of at-risk
students. Id.
190. See, e.g., Silverman, supra note 160 (discussing systemic issues such as poverty,
suspensions, and poor attendance).
191. Helen F. Ladd, Presidential Address: Education and Poverty: Confronting the Evidence,
31 J. POL’Y ANALYIS & MGMT. 203, 219 (2012).
192. Michael A. Rebell & Jessica R. Wolff, Educational Opportunity Is Achievable and
Affordable, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Mar. 2012, at 62, 62.
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added, the rank for the United States drops to the middle of the advanced
industrial nations.193 With a 22% child poverty rate, the problem does not
solely rest with the general educational system; the educational system is
having a poverty crisis.194 Michael Rebell and Jessica Wolff of Columbia
University explain the situation in the following way: “According to a growing
body of research, America will attain its goals of equity in preparing students
to function effectively as citizens and productive workers only through a
concerted effort to eliminate socioeconomic barriers.”195
Through their research, Rebell and Wolff identified multiple areas of
support services that would help children overcome the socioeconomic barriers
to educational success.196 The areas include: (1) early childhood education, (2)
routine and preventative physical and mental health care that assures students
are able to learn effectively, (3) after-school, summer, and other expanded
learning time opportunities to promote the development necessary to succeed
in school, and (4) family engagement that foster students’ academic
development.197 All of these items focus on the local community involvement
that will likely be more difficult for far-away school districts to implement. It
may be unreasonable for the administration and teachers of a receiving school
district to acknowledge, understand, and address some of these issues.198
“The most promising efforts to bring local neighborhoods and schools
together emerge from communities, not from schools.”199 Often times the

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Rebell & Wolff, supra note 192, at 62.
198. One example of a way to improve academic achievement through the use of community
involvement and resource integration is by addressing childhood asthma in the community. See
Paul W. Newacheck & Neal Halfon, Prevalence, Impact, and Trends in Childhood Disability Due
to Asthma, 154 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 287, 290 (2000); but see Howard
Taras & William Potts-Datema, Childhood Asthma and Student Performance at School, 75 J.
SCH. HEALTH 296, 312 (2005). Investing in a system which coordinates the school and
community resources to deal with childhood asthma likely will help address some of these issues
that may go untreated outside the walls of the school. A school district like Francis Howell will
likely have more difficulty implementing programs coordinating community resources and
community involvement for a community that is twenty miles away with vastly different
demographics.
199. Schutz, supra note 188, at 726. See also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING ASTHMA
WITHIN A COORDINATED SCHOOL HEALTH PROGRAM (2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
HealthyYouth/asthma/pdf/strategies.pdf (recommending strategies for schools to address such as
the following: establishing management and support systems for asthma-friendly schools;
providing safe, enjoyable physical education and activity opportunities for students with asthma;
and coordinating school, family, and community efforts to better manage asthma symptoms and
reduce school absences among students with asthma).
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community has an underlying distrust and fear of school officials which, along
with a lack of resources in the schools and inherent bureaucratic barriers,
creates a situation that is not conducive to productive community and school
interaction.200 One scholar described how a lack of “vibrant community-school
relationships” can prevent improvement in academic performance:
[T]eachers simply do not teach effectively when they hold inaccurate deficit
visions of children, families, and communities. Nor can they scaffold their
instruction on what students already know if they do not acknowledge the
skills and capacities that children bring with them. More generally, teachers,
parents, and community members cannot work together effectively (ensuring
that Epstein’s three circles of family, community, and school overlap in
201
supportive ways) if they do not understand each other.

Consequently, there is little hope that school reform effects can be sustained
long-term if there is not a very productive community-school relationship.202
Succeeding in turning around high poverty schools requires a different
approach to community involvement. North Carolina State University’s
Northeast Leadership Academy (NELA) used an innovative approach to
prepare leaders to work in high poverty school districts.203 While the NELA
plan focused on rural, low-performing districts with high poverty, the plan
yields valuable lessons applicable to Normandy School District, which also
deals with high concentrations of poor and minority students and low per-pupil
funding.204 The NELA plan included advocating a “community-focused”
component of the program.205 The program immersed the fellows in the
community so they could “learn how to build networks of partnerships to
provide the critically needed resources, support, and opportunities for students
in high-need schools.”206 The program changed leadership preparation from
school leadership to community leadership.207
While school transfer options might open doors for students with eager and
engaged parents, students who are struggling because of issues beyond the
school’s walls will not benefit from school transfer options. Moreover, these
students are likely the ones left behind. With less funding, unaccredited
schools may not have the money to invest in programs that coordinate
community resources because these unaccredited school districts are spending
millions of dollars to drive students to school districts over twenty miles away.
200. Schutz, supra note 188, at 726.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Bonnie C. Fusarelli & Matt Militello, Racing to the Top with Leaders in Rural, High
Poverty Schools, 43 PLAN. & CHANGING J. 46, 46 (2012).
204. Id. at 46–47.
205. Id. at 52.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 55.
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It is likely that Francis Howell School District might have trouble
implementing programs for students in a community over twenty miles away
for which they have little knowledge or direct experience.
Improvement of an unaccredited school district like Normandy must result
from a comprehensive system of educational and community interactions. The
UDTS greatly disrupts any comprehensive system by taking students out of the
community school district and placing them in multiple different school
districts. The long-term success of the public school system in Normandy
depends on the interactions of the community and the schools attended by
these children. Furthermore, if Normandy becomes insolvent from the
crippling financial effects of the UDTS, students will be transferred to multiple
school districts.208 This will split the Normandy community into new pieces
creating yet another barrier to interactions between the community and the
school districts. For any hope of long-term success in Normandy, the reforms
need to start with and include the community.209
C.

Avoiding the “Unaccredited” Classification and the Effects of the UDTS

Prior to the state dissolving Normandy School District, the Missouri
Association of School Administrators created a proposal that would have
rendered the UDTS moot.210 Its plan involved replacing the current rating
system for accreditation. In this new system, there would be no “unaccredited”
option. Instead, the lowest accreditation level for a district would be
“academically stressed.”211 By avoiding the “unaccredited” label, the proposal
hoped to make the UDTS inapplicable as that statute is based on a district
being unaccredited. If an “academically stressed” school is unable to
demonstrate academic improvement for three consecutive years or for four out
of five years, the state may designate the school building as “Lapsed.” Once a
school is “Lapsed,” then “the students and physical property would be
transferred to another district under current Missouri law.”212
But the state did not change the rating system or the unaccredited
classification; the Board of Education simply dissolved Normandy and created
a new district without any accreditation classification at all. This might stop the
flood of student transfers and its associated tuition bills for Normandy School
district; however, it does not improve the prospects for any other unaccredited

208. Crouch, supra note 121.
209. DAVID MATTHEWS, IS THERE A PUBLIC FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 8, 11 (1996).
210. MO. ASS’N SCH. ADM’RS, A NEW PATH TO EXCELLENCE (2014), available at
http://www.masaonline.org/vimages/shared/vnews/stories/527a57f45c3db/REVISED%20New%
20Path%20To%20Excellence.pdf.
211. Id. If an individual school within a level 3 district achieves a score above fifty percent,
that school would not be considered “academically stressed.” Id.
212. Id.
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school district. The problem of unaccredited school districts and poor academic
performance is a long-standing issue that deserves a comprehensive solution as
the past efforts of DESE and the legislature have failed to fix this problem.
Attempting to avoid the UDTS through a change in application of the
terminology flies in the face of the legislature’s intent. Creating a long-term
solution needs to involve the legislature as such a plan will also require some
consistent funding mechanism. Relying solely on DESE to fix unaccredited
school districts on its own will cause these districts to likely suffer the same
fate as the Wellston School District and its students: the same lack of academic
achievement just under the name of a different school district.
D. Normandy School District’s Last Stand: An Attempt to Fight Back
Shortly after the Board of Education announced its intention to lapse the
district’s accreditation and dissolve the district, Normandy, along with
taxpayers and the school board president, filed a lawsuit against the Board of
Education and the school districts receiving transfer students from
Normandy.213 The lawsuit alleged that “[a]s a result, Normandy School
District’s funds and its taxpayers’ revenues are being diverted outside the
District to excessively subsidize other school districts.”214 The suit further
alleged that DESE has no authority to withhold Normandy’s state funding if
the district would stop paying the tuition bills for its transfer students.215
Similar to Breitenfeld, the suit claimed that the transportation mandate of the
UDTS violates the Hancock Amendment because the State of Missouri did not
provide state financing for the new mandate of providing bus transportation to
other school districts.216 Moreover, the suit also alleged that the UDTS violates
the equal protection clauses of the Missouri Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because the UDTS “disparately impacts
the rights of African-American pupils because the requirement to pay tuition
costs that greatly exceed the actual costs incurred by the Receiving
Districts . . . deprives the Normandy School District of operating funds to
educate the 85% of pupils remaining in the District, who are predominantly
African-American.”217
While the school district in Breitenfeld argued that it was impossible to
comply with mandates of the UDTS, Normandy may find that it will be
impossible to follow through with its lawsuit. The day after Normandy filed its

213. Elisa Crouch, Normandy School District Sues State, Other Districts over School Transfer
Law, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 22, 2014, at A1; Petition for Declaratory Judgment at 6–7,
Normandy Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, No. 14SL-CC01721 (Cir. Ct. St. Louis Cnty. May 21, 2014).
214. Petition for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 213, at 6.
215. Id. at 21–22.
216. Id. at 32–33.
217. Id. at 24–25.
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lawsuit, DESE sent a letter to Dr. McNichols, Normandy’s superintendent,
stating the expenses relating to the lawsuit “have not been and will not be
approved by [DESE].”218 Normandy responded by filing a motion seeking a
temporary restraining order against DESE.219 Normandy also sought to prevent
DESE from withholding $2 million in funding which DESE would use to pay
Normandy’s outstanding tuition bills from April, May, and June.220 A hearing
on the motion was scheduled for June 20, 2014.221
The transfer situation ended for most students on June 20, 2014, prior to
the motion hearing being held. That day, Francis Howell School District
announced their decision to revert to their prior policy of only accepting
transfer students if required by law.222 If the courts agree that the UDTS no
longer applied to Normandy Schools Collaborative, Francis Howell would no
longer be required by law to accept the transfer students from Normandy.223
Normandy Schools Collaborative will save approximately $900,000 by not
providing transportation for the transfer students to Francis Howell School
District schools.224 That same day, Normandy School District dropped its
lawsuit against the Board of Education and the other school districts.225
Normandy’s lawsuit might have resulted in a holding different from the
Breitenfeld case. Breitenfeld contained various unknowns, such as the total
number of transfer students, transfer location, and overall cost. Here,
Normandy experienced the effects of UDTS for one year and thus can provide
a more certain impact of the UDTS’s effects than the district in Breitenfeld.
The district can provide information on the number of students transferring, the
cost of tuition, the cost of transportation, and the negative impact on the
remaining students. Unfortunately, it is unrealistic to think that Normandy
would have had the financial ability to stay afloat long enough to see this case
all the way through the court system. However, the attention of the lawsuit
might keep focus on this issue long enough that the legislature takes action to

218. Letter from Ronald Lankford, Deputy Comm’r, Mo. Dep’t Elementary & Secondary
Educ., to Dr. Ty McNichols, Superintendent, Normandy Sch. Dist. (May 22, 2014), available at
http://dese.mo.gov/sites/default/files/Normandy%20SD%20-%20DESE%20Response%20to%20
Initiation%20of%20Legal%20Action%205-22-14.pdf.
219. Elisa Crouch, Normandy School District Seeks Restraining Order Against the State, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 14, 2014, at A2.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Jessica Block & Elisa Crouch, Francis Howell School District: “No” to Normandy
Students, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 21, 2014, at A1.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Elisa Crouch, Normandy School District Drops Suit Against State Board Over Transfer
Law, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 21, 2014, at A4.
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permanently solve the problems caused by the UDTS.226 A permanent solution
is urgently needed to fix this disruptive educational situation and allow
Normandy students the chance to experience improved schools.
E.

Suggested Alternatives to the Current UDTS

The UDTS not only failed to improve the unaccredited Normandy School
District, it devastated the district’s finances and destroyed the district’s very
existence. It may never be known if Dr. McNichols’ plan for improving
Normandy would have worked, but it is known that the district wasted one
year of rebuilding by having to deal with the crippling financial effects of the
UDTS. While the UDTS may serve as motivator for school districts to avoid
losing accreditation, once a school district becomes unaccredited, the UDTS
creates an almost certain path to financial ruin with little benefit to the majority
of students.
The main defect that plagues the UDTS is the law’s reliance on the
unaccredited school district to fund the tuition and transportation requirements.
It is an unrealistic expectation for a struggling, unaccredited school district to
take on the increased costs of shifting some of its students to other school
districts. These increased costs are especially harmful to the unaccredited
school district not only because they take money away from other
improvement initiatives, but also because the unaccredited school district
cannot decrease its expenditures sufficiently to cover the costs.227 The fixed
costs of building maintenance, electricity, and other items cannot be reduced
proportionally with decreased enrollment, thus creating a deficit for the
unaccredited school district.228 This funding deficit is further exacerbated by
some receiving school districts charging per-student tuition rates that are
higher than the amount of per-student funding that the unaccredited school
district receives from the local, state, and federal funding sources.229
If the legislature wants to keep the transfer option for students in
unaccredited school districts, the UDTS should be changed so that it is funded
in some alternative manner and not by the struggling school district. Passing
some of these costs on to the receiving district would not be an excessive
burden as evidenced by the fact that most of the receiving school districts did
not use all of the tuition funds paid to them, and the amount of extra staff
needed at these receiving districts was minimal. Additionally, the state could
contribute funds to implement the UDTS, although this is likely to be

226. As of this writing, Riverview Gardens School District remained unaccredited and subject
to the UDTS. See Elisa Crouch, Area Districts Will Get Less in Transfer Tuition, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, June 7, 2014, at A1.
227. Hancock, supra note 134.
228. Id.
229. Crouch & Bock, supra note 132.
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politically unpopular, considering the Missouri legislature would not approve
an additional $5 million to keep Normandy out of bankruptcy. In the
alternative, the legislature could take a middle-of-the-road approach by
modifying the tuition calculation method so that the unaccredited school
district only pays 50% of the tuition and the receiving districts absorb the rest
of the costs. This option would keep the UDTS functioning in its intended
manner without creating a financial catastrophe in the unaccredited school
districts.
However, transferring students out of unaccredited school districts and into
schools in distant communities does not solve the problem of failing school
districts. The majority of students are still left behind, and in the case of
Normandy, those students are in a worse position than before due to the
financial problems and uncertainty of their academic future. The legislature
should eliminate the UDTS and focus its efforts on rebuilding the struggling
unaccredited school districts by promoting community-based solutions
including resource integration between the schools and outside organizations
that serve the local community. This will be a step towards a permanent fix for
all students, not just a temporary fix for some students who are willing to
endure long bus rides to transfer to schools far outside their community.
CONCLUSION
The Missouri Constitution creates a fundamental right to a free public
education for children. The Unaccredited District Tuition Statute may help
some students in unaccredited school districts in their pursuit of knowledge,
but for the majority of the students who choose to stay in their communities’
schools, the statute nearly destroys their already struggling public education
system. Moreover, as was shown with Wellston School District, DESE’s plan
to change the governing structure and oversight of the school district will very
likely not be enough to institute meaningful change and improve Normandy’s
future.
For Normandy and other struggling school districts to have a chance at
meaningful long-term improvement, Missouri legislators will need to learn
what many scholars and other policymakers have already figured out: reforms
need to start in and include the community.230 Transferring students to schools
far outside their community is a short-term solution for the limited benefit of
only some of the students that results in the financial ruin of the struggling
school district.231 Any solution that does not include addressing the effects of
impoverished communities on the educational achievements of students is not
230. MATTHEWS, supra note 209, at 8, 11.
231. The superintendent of the unaccredited Riverview Gardens School District pointedly
stated: “We all know full well the transfer law is not financially sustainable for any district that
has to be held accountable to the statute[.]” Crouch, supra note 226.
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likely to turn around a failing school district. When the problem is beyond the
walls of the school buildings, the solutions must include a focus on the
community and its role in supporting the education of students.232 Simply
shipping a portion of the students to another school district twenty miles away
does not solve the problem.
Students who chose to stay in Normandy schools in hopes of being part of
a resurgence of the district are now left with an uncertain future due to the
crippling financial effects of the UDTS. One such student was Raquan Smith, a
senior who had already endured the closing of Wellston schools before being
transferred to Normandy.233 Throughout his senior year, Raquan faced the
prospect that Normandy would also be dissolved, and, yet again, he would be
sent to a different school district. After hearing about Normandy’s decision to
close an elementary school and lay off over 100 employees, Raquan described
Normandy’s situation in the following way: “[The situation is] heart-breaking.
It’s gut-wrenching. I feel like I’m about to lose a part of me . . . I don’t want
teachers to be laid off.”234 One homeowner described the district’s situation as
“torment for all of us.”235 Students were left wondering if they would have
graduation and prom in Normandy or in another school district.236
At the same time, Terry White, the former Normandy star quarterback,
made an immediate positive contribution to Francis Howell North’s basketball
team.237 Terry was not burdened with the prospect of his school district
becoming insolvent before the end of the school year. Terry had little doubt
that he would finish the school year at Francis Howell North. Raquan, on the
other hand, faced an uncertain future yet again because if Normandy became
insolvent during the school year, he would likely be transferred to an unknown
school district to finish out his senior year of high school. The superintendent
of an accredited district acknowledged the unfairness of the situation by
saying, “Just dissolving everything in front of kids’ eyes, there’s nothing child
centered about allowing that to happen.”238 In the end, even those that took
advantage of the opportunity to leave Normandy in hopes of obtaining a better
education might find themselves back in their original position if at some point
in time Francis Howell refuses to allow them to continue their education at

232. See Keels, supra note 181, at 1012 (noting that relocating children to low-poverty
neighborhoods with high-achieving schools without substantial support for children and parents
“offers little hope for a positive shift in the trajectory [of grades]”).
233. Gillerman, supra note 119.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Crouch, supra note 121.
237. David Kvidahl, Francis Howell North Is Enjoying This Season’s Basketball Journey, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 28, 2014, at B6; Nate Latsch, Normandy Transfer White Settles In,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 8, 2014, at B11. See also Latsch, supra note 3.
238. Crouch & Bock, supra note 132.
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their new schools. Even with the UDTS potentially no longer applicable to
Normandy, the statute still disrupts the education of the students at the
struggling school district by allowing Francis Howell to reject these transfer
students.
Now that Normandy School District has experienced the same fate as
Wellston, it remains to be seen whether the school administrators, state
education officials, the legislature, and the community will rally together to
create a plan for long-term academic improvement in Normandy or whether
everyone will watch another plan fail, just like the UDTS failed the students of
Normandy. While the UDTS may no longer apply to Normandy, the statute is
still applicable to the other unaccredited school districts and will likely
continue to disrupt the education of students in the most troubled school
districts.
The superintendent of the Pattonville School District (which is accredited)
may have said it best: “Taking money away from [unaccredited school
districts] is not going to help them. The focus should be on helping
communities, particularly communities of high levels of poverty. You don’t do
that by dismantling the public schools. You do that by helping those schools
get better.”239
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